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I 
Between 1946 and 1950, the problem of preventing 
the spread and use of atomic weapons was high on 
the agenda of the United Nations. At the center of 
the discussion was the Baruch Plan, put forward in 
June 1946 by Mr Bernard Baruch, the US repre-
sentative in the UN Atomic Energy Commission. 
The plan called for the establishment of an interna-
tional control agency, with two general tasks: to 
eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons, and to 
provide all the signatory states with equal 
opportunities for taking part in the peaceful 
utilization of atomic energy. 
Since the scientific-technological «secrew> and 
fissionable materials involved in the non-military 
use of atomic energy could not be fully separated 
from those needed to develop an atomic bomb, the 
basic idea of the Baruch Plan was to place all of 
these essentials under tight international control. 
The international control agency would have 
exclusive ownership to all fissionable raw materi-
als; operate all experimental reactors and nuclear 
power plants; and perform unrestricted on-site 
inspection on national territories. Moreover, the 
Security Council was to be empowered to impose 
swift economic and military sanctions against any 
state discovered violating these regulations. No 
nation should have the right to veto a majority 
decision to use force. Finally, the plan should be 
implemented in stages, so that the United States -
or any other country possessing nuclear weapons -
would not be obliged to dismantle or hand over its 
stockpile until all other provisions of the control 
regime had been implemented. 
The US plan won the support of an 
overwhelming majority in both the UN Atomic 
Energy Commission and the Security Council -
thereby becoming <<the majority plam>. The Soviet 
Union, however, preferred its own «Gromyko 
plan», which placed all ownership and operation 
rights and most control functions in the hands of 
national governments, maintained the veto power, 
and insisted that all provisions of the treaty should 
be implemented simultaneously - with the 
implication that the United States would lose its 
stockpile of atomic bombs the moment it signed 
the treaty. 
So far, the historiography of the Baruch Plan 
has focused on two questions: What were the true 
motives behind the US proposal? And, secondly, 
why did the Soviet leaders reject it? The aim of the 
present article - which will show how Norway, 
Denmark, and Sweden responded to the US drive 
for international atomic energy control - is to shed 
some light on a third, and hitherto largely 
neglected problem: Why were so many Western 
capitalist countries ready to accept the US plan? 
Considering its extremely radical provisions, which 
no doubt would have represented an unprecedented 
intrusion by a transnational body into the scientific, 
economic and military policies of sovereign nation 
states, it may seem surprising that there was not 
more grumbling or outspoken criticism to be heard 
from nations wedded to the principles of scientific ' 
freedom and economic liberalism - or, for that 
matter, from the young social democracies, which 
at that time saw an expansion of the economic 
control functions of national governments as a 
precondition for economic growth. 
The Scandinavian countries represent an 
interesting case in this context for at least three 
reasons. First of all, despite their smallness and 
limited capabilities, they were all in a relatively 
advanced position in nuclear science and atomic 
energy research. Thus, the Scandinavian 
governments could hardly dismiss the problem of 
atomic energy control as irrelevant to their own 
countries. 
Secondly, Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
differed so much in their industrial structores and 
their scientific/technological aspirations that they 
are unlikely to have shared the same economic 
interest in the US plan. 
Finally, during the period considered here, the 
three countries chose different solutions to their 
national security problems - with Denmark and 
Norway joining NATO and Sweden holding on to 
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its traditional status of neutrality. Thus, if national 
security orientation and military functional ties tu 
the United States played any role in determining 
Western attitudes to the majority plan, Scandinavia 
seems a promising place to look for the evidence. 
11 
The official attitudes of the Scandinavian countries 
towards the US plan were exposed most clearly by 
their voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. 
Prior to 1948, the international debate over the US 
and Soviet proposals was confmed mainly to the 
UN Atomic Energy Commission, or UNAEC. 
Norway was to become a member of that body in 
1949, but until then, the role of the Scandinavian 
countries was essentially to applaud the efforts 
being made by others. 
From the fall of 1948, however, the Scandina-
vian countries were regularly called upon to take a 
more explicit and binding stand.' By then, the 
negotiations in the UNAEC had reached an 
impasse. As a result, both superpowers turned tu 
the General Assembly for support. For three 
subsequent years, the Scandinavian countries tuok 
a unified position in the debates in the General 
Assembly -- always voting with the majority, and 
always expressing general approval of the majority 
plan.' Thus, even if they did not explicitly commit 
themselves to the specific provisions of the plan, 
the overall effect of their voting was to strengthen 
the international backing of it 
Behind the scenes, however, things looked 
different. The identical Scandinavian voting 
patterns were not a reflection of identical attitudes 
to the majority plan. Instead, the unified votes 
came about in spite of considerable differences of 
opinion - and only after thorough inter-
governmental discussions with the specific aim of 
working out a joint stand. The most important 
forums for these discussions were the Nordic 
Foreign Ministry Meetings, which .took place each 
fall in preparation for the annnal session of the 
General Assembly, and the closely related 
meetings of the Nordic Atomic Advisory 
Committee - a body of ten Scandinavian experts 
which had been established to advise the Foreign 
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Ministers on the technical, economic, and legal 
aspects of the control problem. 
In fact, the records of these discussions show 
that some of the initial national positions were 
almost the opposite of those officially expressed in 
the United Nations. For example, 
in 1948, Sweden expressed such strong 
reservations about the majority plan that Denmark 
and Norway, in order to reach a unified Scandina-
vian position, were forced to moderate their much 
more positive stands; 
in 1949, Norway contemplated an initiative to 
end the UN talks and dissolve the UNAEC. It 
dropped the idea, however, after it had been flatly 
rejected by Denmark and Sweden; 
finally, in 1950, Denmark tried to win support 
for a joint Nordic move in favor of a radically new 
approach to the problem of atomic energy control. 
The proposal stranded on strong Norwegian-
Swedish opposition. 
Now, what may these different positions and 
initiatives tell us about the real attitudes of the 
Scandinavian countries? 
III 
In accordance with the heuristic principle that, in 
investigating complicated matters one should always 
start by solving the least difficult problem, I will 
begin with the case of Denmark. 
Danish policy, my sources indicate, was guided 
first of all by a strong and unqualified commitment to 
the goal of nuclear disarmament. As long as the hope -
of reaching an agreement in the UNAEC had not 
been totally exbausted, this commitment called for 
the strongest possible support of the majority plan -
in order to maximize the international pressure on 
Moscow to accept it - combined with a readiness to 
discuss possible alterations which might make it 
easier to bring the Soviets along. 
Thus, when the Nordic Foreign Ministers met in 
Stockholm in September 1948 to discuss what 
position they should take on the majority plan at the 
forthcoming General Assembly debate, Gustav 
Rasmussen of Denmark argued that it would be 
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«unforlwlate» if the Nordic countries rejected a 
proposal which had already won such broad interna-
tional approval.' Apparently, he was less concerned 
about the technical merits of the proposal than about 
the negative political impact that a Nordic rejection 
might have on the prospect of reaching an 
agreement. 
This attitude was confinned in the discussions 
that followed the Norwegian drive in 1949 tu 
terminate the UN negotiations. The records show that 
Denmark took the lead in killing that initiative. When 
the matter was brought before the Nordic Atomic 
Advisory Committee in August 1949, the Danish 
representatives claimed that a termination of the UN 
negotiations at this point would harm Nordic 
interests. Rather than be instrumental in 
discontinuing the talks, they encouraged Norway to 
use its membership in the UNAEC in a constructive 
way - to improve the chances for a mutually 
acceptable agreement. Finally, the Danes made it 
clear that any recommendation in favor of ending the 
UN taIks would have to be made the «personal 
responsibility» of the Norwegian and Swedish 
nuclear scientists.' At the Nordic Foreign Ministers 
Meeting in Copenhagen two weeks later, Rasmussen 
added to this that Denmark would oppose any move 
to terminate the negotiations as long as the hope 
remained for some kind of international agreement.' 
That Rasmussen's position was based on 
idealistic rather than political concerns can be seen 
from the fact that he decided to block the Norwegian 
initiative although he knew that it would have been 
applauded by US authorities.' Thus, the Danes were 
concerned about the principle at stake, and the 
symbolic importance of not giving up the quest for a 
mutually acceptable solution, rather than pleasing 
Washington. 
Ironically, this idealistic concern was soon to be 
transformed into a Danish initiative - which, in turn, 
was blocked by Norwegian-Swedish «realism». The 
initiative came about in response to a series of 
dramatic events in late 1949 and early 1950 which 
brought the UN taIks to a collapse. The Soviet 
nuclear weapons test in September 1949 prompted a 
more confrontational US approach to the control 
problem. While making it clear that it did not 
contemplate any new arms control inititatives 
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tuwards Moscow, the Truman administration 
responded to this event by launching a program to 
develop a hydrogen bomb - a firm sign that it would 
not voluntarily give up its superiority in nuclear 
weapons. A week earlier the Soviet Union had 
walked out of the UNAEC to protest Taiwan's 
continuing presence there at the expense of the 
People's Republic of China These developments 
made the Norwegian representative in the UNAEC 
report to Oslo that it now seemed «Worthless to make 
any further attempts with respect to atomic energy 
control uniess it can be done as a part of an over-all . 
settlement with the Soviet UniOID>.' 
This was not how the situation was perceived in 
Copenhagen, however. Rather than putting the quest 
for atomic energy control aside pending a solution to 
the more fundamental issues of the Cold War 
conflict, the Danes saw a solution of the atomic 
energy problem as the key to a more comprehensive 
settlement. The first public expression of this position 
was made by a private citizen - Professor Niels Bohr, 
the distinguished nuclear physicist. In an «open 
letteD> to the United Nations in mid-June 1950, Bohr 
made a call for «an open world» - arguing that, in the 
nuclear era, world peace could only be preserved by 
full military and scientific transparency between 
nations. As a starting point, he asked all governments 
to commit themselves to an unrestricted international 
exchange about atomic energy matters. In Bohr's 
view, such a confidence-building measure would not 
only pave the way for a permanent solution of the 
control problem, but also help eliminate the threat of 
secretly planned aggression and enhance the prospect 
for peaceful international cooperation in the atomic 
energy field. A revolution had taken place in the field 
of nuclear science, Bohr concluded. Now, the time 
was ripe for a similar revolution in the field of 
international politics.' 
Bohr's «Open Letter» was controversial - to put it 
mildly. It is quite remarkable, therefore, that the 
Danish government decided to explore the possibility 
of a joint Scandinavian initiative on the matter. But 
first the Danes tried to enlist US support. 
On 20 June 1950, the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs instructed its Ambassador in 
Washington to inform the US Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson that an instant and unqualified US 
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commitment to the principles advocated by Profes-
sor Bohr would dramatically improve the prospect 
of an agreement on atomic energy control, and 
might also have a decisive impact on political 
developments in countries like India, Yugoslavia 
and China.' 
The outbreak of the Korean War five days later 
ruined the opportunity for a meeting with Acheson. 
Instead, the Ambassador met with George Kennan, 
who assured him that, while unable to make any 
official cOll)lIlitments, the US government would 
give Professor Bohr's proposals its most serious 
consideration." On the basis of this «polite» 
response, the Danish government turned its 
attention towards Oslo and Stockholm in order to 
explore the possibility of a joint Scandinavian 
initiative. Prime Minister Hedtoft discussed the 
matter with his colleagues ErIander of Sweden and 
Gerhardsen of Norway, and asked for a special 
meeting to be arranged with Professor Bohr, 
Foreign Ministers Rasmussen, Lange, and Unden, 
and himself to examine the problem." Also the 
Nordic Atomic Advisory Committee placed the 
issue on its agenda. 
These discussions resulted in nothing, however 
- for reasons I will return to in a moment. Here, 
suffice it to say that the unsuccessful Danish 
initiative of 1950 was spurred by the same 
commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament 
that had made Denmark the most eager supporter 
of the majority plan in 1948, and the strongest 
opponent of the Norwegian initiative to end the 
UN negotiations in 1949. 
Many factors may help to explain the idealistic 
character of the Danish approach. First of all, it 
may have been part of a more general pattern: in a 
recent study, Tor EgiI ForIand shows that a devot-
ion to high principles can be seen in other areas of 
Danish Cold War foreign policy as well." 
However, there are strong indications that the 
Danish initiative should be seen mainly as a 
reflection of the limited scope and ambitions of the 
Danish atomic energy program. 
That program was characterized by being 
strictly confined to the area of nuclear physics -
with professor Niels Bohr's institute in 
Copenhagen as the dynamic center. Now, since a 
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major goal of the majority plan was to strengthen 
the international basis of this kind of scientific and 
theoretical work, the Danes did not have to fear 
any negative consequences of the plan. This fact, 
together with the total absence of any national 
economic and military interests in the practical 
application of atomic energy, gave the Danish 
authorities the privilege of approaching the 
question of international control from a disintere-
sted and idealistic angle. I' 
IV 
Sweden, in contrast, was never a disinterested 
party in these matters. Indeed, in 1948 Swedish 
officials cited national interests as the major reason 
for their inability to commit Sweden more strongly 
to the US plan. According to Foreign Minister 
0sten Unden, the Swedish Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Swedish defense 
establishment were skeptical about the technical 
feasibility of the plan. If the proposed control 
measures were inadequate, they argued, the 
implementation of the plan could undermine, rather 
than enhance, Swedish security. They also warned 
Unden that the proposed control system would 
make it necessary for Sweden to disclose its own 
industrial and military secrets. At the time, the 
Swedish atomic energy program contained both a 
civilian and a military arm - the first concentrating 
on the problems of uranium enrichment and reactor 
technology, the latter on plutonium chemistry and 
possible nuclear weapons' designs. It is easy to 
understand, therefore, why Unden proposed to his 
Nordic colleagues that they should not commit 
themselves to the specific provisions of the plan 
before its technical, economic and legal 
consequences for the Scandinavian countries had 
been thoroughly anaIyzed - a suggestion which led 
to the establishment of the Nordic Atomic 
Advisory Committee. I. 
Before I proceed to explain the negative Swe-
dish response to the Norwegian and Danish 
initiatives of 1949 and 1950, I shall make some 
comments about Norway. The Norwegian and 
Swedish positions were both very similar and very 
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different. In this particular case, therefore, a «look 
to Norway» may also make it easier to see what 
characterized the policies of Sweden. 
At frrst glance, the similarities between Norway 
and Sweden were more striking than the 
differences. After the Second World War, both 
countries had launched ambitious R&D programs 
to investigate possible industrial and military 
applications of atomic energy. Moreover, both 
. programs were characterized by close cooperation 
between the civilian and military research 
establishments. 
Despite these similarities, Norwegian 
authorities did not share the Swedish concern that 
their national efforts might be adversely affected 
by the majority plan. In the fall of 1948, Norwe-
gian Foreign Minister Lange could therefore 
inform his Nordic colleagues that the prevailing 
view among Norwegian experts was that the US-
sponsored plan took care of all relevant Norwegian 
interests in the atomic energy field." 
Why did Norway and Sweden reach such 
different conclusions? Part of the answer has to do 
with the different structures and directions of their 
non-military atomic energy programs. The Norwe-
gian waterfalls, which provided Norway with an 
abundant potential for hydro-electric power 
production, made the economic rationale for a 
vigorous atomic energy program much weaker in 
Norway than in Sweden." In addition, the costs of 
processing the scarce national sources of natural 
uranium would be relatively higher in Norway's 
case - and might even turn out to be impossible 
without foreign assistance. In the view of Professor 
Gunnar Randers, the director of the Norwegian 
Atomic Energy Institite, the best solution to this 
problem would be to use the valuable stocks of 
Norwegian heavy water as a means to purchase 
uranium from abroad - from the United States, if 
possible; otherwise from the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, France, or Sweden. 
The Swedes, who had no similar treat to offer, 
put more emphasis on self-sufficiency. This 
fundamental difference between the «blue-yellow 
line» of Sweden and the internationally oriented 
strategy of Norway explains why the Swedish 
evaluation of the economic implications of the 
IFS Info 8/94 
majority plan was so preoccupied with risks and 
losses, whereas Norwegian experts focused on 
opportunities and gains.17 
Equally important, there was a striking contrast 
in how the two countries evaluated the military 
implications of the plan. As we have seen, the 
Swedish defense establishment feared that the 
proposed control measures would not be effective 
enough to provide a credible guarantee against 
violations of the agreement. The implicit danger 
was that Sweden could be forced to surrender its 
own program for research into nuclear weapons, 
while the Soviet Union secretly continued its 
programs, thereby gaining an unacceptable military 
advantage. 
The professional Norwegian assessment was 
radically different. The experts at the Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment (FFI) felt that the 
technical aspects of the proposed contrul system 
was a factor of «minor importance» as far as the 
Norwegian position on the majority plan was 
concerned. This conclusion rested on the argument 
that Norway under any circumstances would have 
to assume a nuclear attack against its territory in 
case of war. This was so, not so much because the 
proposed control measures might be inadequate -
the possibility which the Swedes were so 
concerned about - but because the measures came 
too late. As the original FFI report put it, Norwe-
gian defense experts did not «quite share the 
official American view that Russia has not made 
much headway in this field». Instead, the FFI 
experts found it reasonable to assume that the 
Soviets had already built nuclear reactors, and that 
they were coming close to experiments with 
explosives." 
This pessimistic - but very accurate - estimate 
of the status of the Soviet program helps to explain 
why Norwegian military planners in 1948 had so 
few qualms about the majority plan: their worst-
case scenario would remain essentially the same, 
regardless of whatever international arrangements 
were made to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons. In a similar fashion, they concluded that 
Norway's own military capabilities would remain 
unaffected by the plan, since Norway under no 
circumstances could be expected to develop 
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nuclear weapons within the current long-term 
planning period of 10 years." 
As a preliminary conclusion, therefore, we may 
say that the different Norwegiao and Swedish 
attitudes to the majority plan were a result of 
different estimates about its economic and military 
implications. Sweden's qualified support reflected 
fears that the plan might give too little in terms of 
security and demand too much in terms of 
economic-industrial potential. Norway's much 
stronger commitment reflected the feeling that the 
plan was irrelevant to Norway's national security 
problem, but potentially helpful to its non-military 
atomic energy efforts. 
v 
The only problem with this conclusion is that it 
does not seem to square with what happened 
afterwards. Considering its strong initial support of 
the majority plan, why would Norway - as it did in 
1949 - prefer to cancel the UN talks and dissolve 
the UNAEC? And why would Sweden, the most 
reluctant supporter of the plan, oppose that move? 
Would it not have been more compatible with the 
initital attitudes of both countries if their roles in 
1949 had been reversed? 
As we shall now see, the apparent 
incompatibility between their 1948 and 1949 
positions disappears as soon as we bring a third 
causal factor into the analysis: NATO. Even if the 
United States at first made it a virtue not to discuss 
the problem of atomic energy control in NATO, 
the events of 1949 strongly suggest that the diffe-
rent national security orientations of Norway and 
Sweden had a crucial impact on their attitudes to 
the UN negotiations and the majority plan. 
In the case of Norway, its membership in 
NATO had the effect of redirecting its search for 
uranium and technological assistance away from 
Western Europe and towards the United States. By 
the spring of 1949, it had become increasingly 
clear that none of the most likely West European 
candidates was able or willing to solve Norway's 
uranium problem - at least not in the short term.2• 
As shown in a previous study by Astrid For-
land, these developments made the Norwegian 
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authorities decide to make a second attempt with 
the Americans. After a series of high-level 
consultations in Washington in May 1949, Profes-
sor Randers concluded that, due to the extremely 
tight export regulations of the US atomic energy 
law, Norway could not expect any special 
American assistance as long as the UN talks went 
on. If the negotiations collapsed, however, the US 
Congress might change the law in such a way that 
would benefit Norwegian interests." Rander's 
optimism in this regard had been fed by countless 
allusions from US officials during his talks in 
Washington. For example, Mr Gordon Ameson, 
the leading expert on atomic energy matters in the 
US State Department, told Randers that Norway 
was «on top» of his list of potential receivers of US 
assistance - a privilege he explicitly linked to 
Norway's membership in NATO. He saw no 
similar place in the sun for Sweden, however. On 
the contrary, Arneson pointed out that the Swedes, 
who he felt were «asking for a free ride», were on 
the very bottom of that list 22 
Most likely, these allusions were part of a 
deliberate US strategy to impede, rather than help, 
the Norwegian reactor program." Happily ignorant 
of this possibility, however, Randers concluded· 
that it would be better for Norway if the 
negotiations in the UNAEC were brought to an 
end. Thus, in June 1949 he advised the Foreign 
Ministry in Oslo to consider whether Norway 
should put forward an official proposal to 
terminate the UN talks.24 
It is less known that Randers and Lange 
thereafter made a coordinated effort to enlist 
Scandinavian support for such an initiative." Thus, 
when the experts of the Nordic Atomic Advisory 
Committee met in Stockholm at the end of August 
1949, Randers presented the same arguments as 
those just referred to - with one notable difference: 
rather than point out how Norwegian national 
interests would be best served by ending the 
negotiations, he now stressed that the prospect of 
increased US technical assistance was of the 
«utmost importance» to all Nordic countries" -
quite the opposite of what he had been told in 
Washington. Two weeks later, at the Nordic 
Foreign Ministers Meeting, Lange confirmed that 
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Norway might vote in favor of dissolving the 
UNAEC." 
As mentioned, Denmark would hear nothing of 
a Nordic initiative of this sort. The Swedish 
attitude was more ambivalent. On the one hand, it 
is clear that the Swedish nuclear scientists were 
inclined to agree with Randers.28 
On the other hand, that position was overruled 
by Foreign Minister Unden, who informed his 
Nordic colleagues that he personally sympathized 
with the official French position that it would be 
better to put off the taIks than to dissolve the 
Commission. Halvard Lange countered that the 
French view most likely reflected the influential 
role of the French Communist Party, but this 
argument had no visible impact on Unden. 
Realizing that the Swedes could not be brought 
along, Lange caved in, saying that in the present 
situation he could see «plenty of reasons» for 
simply voting in favor of continuing the UN talks 
on the basis of the majority plan." 
Why did Undc!n oppose the Norwegian 
proposal? As hard evidence is lacking, speculations 
must suffice. The most compelling one, I think, is 
that the Swedish authorities found the proposed 
initiative too risky. It was politically risky because 
Sweden could end up as part of a highly exposed 
minority together with Norway, the USA, Britain, 
and a few other NATO countries. Finally, it was 
economically and militarily risky for the very same 
reason that made it so attractive to the Norwegian 
side: the prospect of US help. 
It would be more than strange if those in charge 
of the Swedish atomic energy establishment were 
affected by any illusions on this point. They had 
already tried very hard to obtain US help - with no 
results." At one point, the US Secretary of State 
George Marshall even informed Undc!n that 
Sweden could not expect any favorable action on 
pending applications until it was willing to disclose 
the exact nature and purpose of its atomic energy 
program. In reality, as Marshall told the US 
Ambassador in Stockholm on a strictly confidential 
basis, no US assistance could be expected, even if 
the information asked for was put on the table. The 
reason was simple: the USA did not want to assist 
the Swedish effort. As Marshall put it: The «safest 
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place for Swedish uranium is in the ground.»" 
If Unden and his advisers had only the slightest 
suspicion that this was how the Americans 
regarded the Swedish program, that would go a 
long way to explain their reluctance in 1949 to help 
close the UN taIks. 
VI 
What is left for us to explain is why Norway and 
Sweden, despite their different relationships to the 
United States and different stakes in the UNAEC 
taIks, were brought so quickly together again by 
their common oppositon to the «Bohr plan». 
In Oslo, the immediate reaction to Bohr's letter 
was that it contained <<little ofinteresD>," and that 
there was a «bad climate» for initiatives of this 
kind." When Lange met with the Professor in 
August 1950, he made a similar point, arguing that 
in view of the difficult situation in Korea, he 
strongly doubted the wisdom of raising an issue of 
this sort with the United States.34 
Back in Oslo, Lange took steps to ensure that 
the Norwegian members of the Nordic Atomic 
Advisory Committee prepared for a discussion of 
Bohr's proposal at the next Committee meeting." 
When the Committee met in Copenhagen at the 
end of August, the Norwegian representatives 
worked efficiently, together with their Swedish 
colleagues, to block any joint Scandinavian 
diplomatic initiative on the matter. The Norwe-
gian-Swedish arguments were practically identical, 
and fell into two categories. First, the delegates 
claimed that, from a strictly technical point of 
view, nothing had happened during the last year 
which might call· for a different attitude to the 
problem of international atomic energy control: the 
US proposal was still workable, and the Soviet 
plan remained equally inadequate. Secondly, when 
one of the Danish members suggested that there 
might be compelling political reasons for a new 
approach, the Swedish-Norwegian delegates took 
the position that the Committee should refrain from 
making political recommendations. They thereafter 
proposed a political recommendation of their own: 
namely, to advise the Nordic governments to take 
Ill! further action on the matter - a proposal which 
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the Danish representatives somewhat grudgingly 
accepted." Eventually, the Scandinavian 
governments followed that advice. 
In retrospect, it is easy to see why Norway 
opposed the Bohr plan: at the best, it would serve 
to revive and prolong the UN talks which Norway 
now preferred to tenninate; at the worst, it would 
build international support in favor of a less 
satisfactory control regime. Under any 
circumstances, the fuet that Norway had supported 
it could only undennine the prospect for a special 
US-Norwegian nuclear relationship in the future. 
As Randers put it, it would be «dangerous» for the 
Nordic countries to make any initiative of this sort 
without explicit backing from the Western 
powers.37 
Sweden, too, must have seen the Danish 
initiative as an all-lose, no-win option. For one 
thing, Swedish authorities may have feared that an 
abortive attempt to revive the UN negotiations 
could boost the process towards the establishment 
of two separate control and cooperation regimes, 
centered around the Soviet Union and the United 
States - a development which could very easily 
have left neutral countries like Sweden out in the 
cold. Equally important, steps were now taken to 
speed up Sweden's secret nuclear weapons 
research program." Bohr's call for transparency 
and openness ran contrary to the nature and 
direction of this effort. 
Finally, Sweden's freedom of action may have 
been restricted by its silent collaboration with the 
United States in the very sensitive field of nuclear 
export control. In August 1948, the US govern-
ment took steps to establish a top secret export 
control system with the aim of denying the Soviet 
Union and other Communist countries access to 
raw materials and technologies useful for the 
development of nuclear weapons. Preceding the 
similar initiatives on CoCom, and deliberately 
separated from them to allow possible non-CoCom 
members to take part, the first invitations to join 
this club of secret guardians of the US nuclear 
monopoly went to six West European nations: 
Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Norway - all possessors of raw materials 
or technologies deemed relevant to atomic energy 
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production. As a result of these inquiries, Norway 
agreed to stop all exports of heavy water to the 
Communist world, whereas Sweden confinned an 
earlier secret agreement with the US government not 
to make its uranium compounds or reprocessing 
technologies available to the Soviet Union." 
For Norway, which later decided to join both 
NATO and CoCom, the participation in this secret 
export control regime is unlikely to have made much 
difference to its positions on international atomic 
energy control. Sweden, however, may well have 
found that its involvement in this effort made it more 
difficult to criticize US positions and proposals. The 
Danish authorities, in contrast, had no similar 
functional ties to Washington to concern them. 
Because ofDemnark's total lack offissionable 
resources and potentially useful technologies, the 
United States did not bother to request Danish 
support until the spring of 1950 - apparently without 
success.40 
VII 
Returning to the opening question of why the 
Western capitalist countries were so supportive of the 
US-sponsored majority plan, the findings presented 
in this article seem to justify two broad conclusions: 
The first, and most trivial one, is that they 
supported it for very different kinds of reasons. To 
the extent that the Scandinavian attitudes were 
representative of a more general pattern, the Western 
unity behind the majority plan was made up of at 
least three different kinds of supporters: the idealists, 
like the Danes, who combined economic and military 
disinterest with a strong commitment to the goals of 
nuclear disarmament; the positive realists, like the 
Norwegians, who had little faith in the plan in terms 
of national security, but found it economically 
attractive; and the negative realists, like the Swedes, 
who feared that the plan might have negative 
economic and military consequences for themselves, 
but decided to support it on a general basis in the 
absence of any better alternative - or, perhaps, 
because they realized that it would never be 
implemented anyhow. 
The second conclusion is that the Western unity 
behind the US plan may also have been less solid 
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than it appeared at the time. As shown by the 
Swedish reservations in 1948 and the abortive 
Norwegian and Danish initiatives of 1949 and 
1950, the United States could not take an endless 
and unqualified Western support for granted. For 
instance, Western unity might be challenged by 
impatient idealist countries like Denmark which 
were ready to consider alternative approaches to 
the control problem if this could enhance the 
chance for Soviet approval. Positive realist 
countries like Norway might become so frustrated 
by the absence of US assistance that they would 
prefer to bury the majority plan and opt for a 
priviJiged nuclear relationship with the United 
States. Finally, there was always the risk that the 
Swedes and other negative realists might withdraw 
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their general support the moment they were asked 
to embrace the specific provisions of the proposed 
control regime. 
What kept this fissionable consensus together 
was, of course, the Jack of realistic alternatives, and 
the perceived political and military necessity of 
maintaining a unified block against the Soviet Union. 
This conclusion, in turn, raises an interesting 
question: What would have happened to the Western 
unity if Moscow had suddenly accepted the majority 
plan? Since there are no wrong or right answers to a 
contra-factual question, let me conclude by sugge-
sting that a Soviet acceptance of the majority plan 
would indeed have represented a more serious threat 
to Western unity, than the threat actually posed by 
the Soviet decision to reject it 
1 1 
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